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Extremely Preterm Birth and Parental Authority
to Refuse Treatment — The Case of Sidney Miller
George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
Disputes between physicians and patients over
medical care have tended toward resolution in both
the courts and ethics committees, with each of these
bodies ultimately deciding that the informed, competent patient must be the final decision maker.
Parents, too, have the authority to make medical decisions for their children, but these decisions can
be challenged if physicians do not believe they are
medically reasonable. One bioethical issue, however, is as intractable today as it was 30 years ago,
when it began to be publicly discussed: the extent
of parental authority to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for an extremely premature infant.
Who decides for the newborn, and on what basis,
when there is conflict between the parents and the
physician? In his 1984 book on this topic, Robert
Weir put it simply and accurately: “Without doubt,
decision making is difficult in cases involving birthdefective newborns.”1 This remains true today, with
virtually no change in either the substantive criteria
to apply to the decision or the procedures to follow,
and decision making is even more complex with
extremely preterm infants.
Advances in neonatology have far outpaced decision-making practices in the neonatal intensive
care unit (NICU), a situation well illustrated in Miller
v. HCA.2 This case, which was decided in the fall of
2003 by the Supreme Court of Texas, involved the
1990 treatment of Sidney Miller, an extremely premature neonate, at Women’s Hospital of Texas in
Houston. Even though the birth at issue took place
more than 13 years ago, nothing has changed in
the practice of neonatal medicine since then that
would prevent repetition today. The facts of the
case, as described here, are taken from the court’s
opinion.

gestation. On ultrasonography, her fetus was found
to weigh about 629 g, and attempts were made to
stop labor by using drugs. Subsequently, an infection developed that Miller’s medical team thought
could endanger her life if delivery were further postponed. Her obstetrician, Dr. Mark Jacobs, and a
neonatologist, Dr. Donald Kelley, informed her and
her husband, Mark Miller, that the fetus had little
chance of being born alive and that if it did survive,
it would probably suffer severe impairments, including brain hemorrhage, blindness, lung disease,
and mental retardation. Mark Miller later testified
that the physicians also told him that they had
“never had such a premature infant live and that
anything they did to sustain the infant’s life would
be guesswork.”2
Jacobs and Kelley then asked the Millers to decide whether or not the infant should be treated at
birth. The Millers told the physicians that they wanted no heroic measures performed. Kelley recorded
this decision in the medical record of Karla Miller,
and Jacobs informed the medical staff of the hospital that no neonatologist would be needed at the
delivery. Mark Miller then left the hospital to make
funeral arrangements.
While Miller was away, the nursing staff informed other medical personnel about the instruction not to have a neonatologist present at the birth.
Meetings were held with various hospital administrators and physicians, who then met with Miller
on his return to the hospital. Miller later testified
that a hospital administrator in charge of the neonatal intensive care unit, Anna Summerfield, told
him that the hospital had a policy that required the
resuscitation of any baby who was born weighing
more than 500 g. Jacobs recalls the decision then
made in this way:

the birth of sidney miller
Karla Miller, the mother of the infant Sidney, went
into premature labor at approximately 23 weeks of
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What we finally decided that everyone wanted
to do was not to make the call prior to the time
we actually saw the baby. Deliver the baby, be-
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cause you see there was this [question,] is
the baby really 23 weeks, or is the baby further along, how big is the baby, what are we
dealing with. We decided to let the neonatologist make the call by looking directly at the
baby at birth.2
The neonatologist who attended the birth, Dr. Eduardo Otero, was not at the meeting, but he agreed
with Jacobs that he would have to see the newborn
to decide what treatment, if any, was appropriate.
Mark Miller testified that, after the meeting, the hospital administrators asked him to sign a consent
form that would allow resuscitation, but he refused.
When he asked the administrators how he could
prevent resuscitation, he was told that he would
have to remove his wife from the hospital.
Later that evening, Karla Miller’s condition worsened, and it was determined that labor should be
augmented (rather than stopped as it had been)
before further complications developed. When Sidney was born, she weighed 615 g and had a heartbeat. Otero noted that she gasped for air, cried spontaneously, and had no unusual dysmorphic features.
Accordingly, he immediately manually ventilated
and intubated her and placed her on a ventilator.
He did this, in his words,
because this baby is alive and this is a baby
that has a reasonable chance of living. And
again, this is a baby that is not necessarily going to have problems later on. There are babies that survive at this gestational age — with
this weight — that later on go on and do well.2

the lawsuit

brain to drain fluids, and needed care twenty-four
hours a day.”2 No improvement in her condition
was expected.
The parents did not sue any of the physicians involved but, instead, sued the hospital and its parent
company, HCA, for battery and negligence. Mark
Miller explained to the press that he did not blame
the physicians, because he and his wife “thought the
doctors just did what they were told” to do by hospital officials.3
The physicians were involved in the trial because
the lawsuit alleged that they acted as the agents of
the hospital, and so the hospital was legally responsible for their actions. The jury concluded that the
resuscitation had been performed without consent
and that the negligence of the hospital and HCA
“proximately caused the occurrence in question.”
Moreover, the jury concluded that both HCA and
the hospital were grossly negligent, that the hospital itself acted with malice, and that Otero was the
hospital’s agent in the resuscitation of Sidney. The
jury awarded the Millers $29,400,000 for medical expenses, $17,503,066 in interest on these expenses,
and $13,500,000 in punitive damages.3

the a ppeal
The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict and ordered that the Millers get nothing.4 The
court reasoned that, in Texas, parents could withhold medical treatment from a child only after the
child’s medical condition had been certified as “terminal” under the Texas Natural Death Act. The appeals court also noted that a court order is usually
required to override a parental refusal of treatment,
but it ruled that if the need for treatment by a child
who is not terminally ill is urgent, a court order is
unnecessary. The court thus agreed with HCA that
it owed no duty to the Millers to refrain from resuscitating Sidney or to have a policy prohibiting resuscitation of patients like Sidney without parental
consent. A dissenting judge believed that the Texas
Natural Death Act was not applicable, that a court
order was required to overcome parental refusal of
treatment, and that a reviewing court would have to
determine which action was in the best interests of
the child.4

Neither parent objected to the treatment of Sidney
after her birth, and therefore, decision making in
the NICU was not explored at trial. Sidney seemed
to do well at first — the score on her Apgar test,
which, on a scale of 1 to 10, reflects the condition of
a newborn immediately after birth, improved from a
3 at one minute to a 6 at five minutes — but a few
days later, she suffered a brain hemorrhage that
caused severe physical and mental impairment. At
the time of the trial, she was seven years old and
“could not walk, talk, feed herself, or sit up on her
own . . . [,] was legally blind, suffered from sethe texa s supreme court
vere mental retardation, cerebral palsy, seizures,
and spastic quadriparesis in her limbs . . . [,] The Texas Supreme Court summarized the case
could not be toilet-trained, required a shunt in her precisely as requiring it “to determine the respective
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roles that parents and healthcare providers play in
deciding whether to treat an infant who is born alive
but in distress and is so premature that, despite advancements in neonatal intensive care, [he or she]
has a largely uncertain prognosis.”2 This was the
first time a case that raised this question had come
to the Texas Supreme Court, and the court began by
summarizing existing law: “Generally speaking, the
custody, care, and nurture of an infant resides in
the first instance with the parents.”2 This includes,
the court stated, the presumption that the parents
have the right to consent to their infant’s medical
treatment as well as to refuse such treatment. The
real question relates to the limits of the parents’ right
to refuse. In this regard, the court noted that the
state punishes parents only for what amounts to
child abuse or child neglect and that “as long as parents choose from professionally accepted treatment
options the choice is rarely reviewed in court.”2 In
other words, in the absence of child neglect, parents have the right to give or withhold consent for
medical treatment for their children.
The ultimate question the court confronted was
this: Is there an emergency exception to this general rule that permits physicians to treat neonates
without parental consent? The court relied exclusively on dicta from a 1920 case that involved a tonsillectomy in a child, to which an older sister had
consented. The child died as a result of the anesthesia, and the father sued the surgeon for failure to
obtain his consent for the surgery.5 In that case the
court determined that parental consent was legally
required, because although “there was an absolute
necessity for a prompt operation,” the situation
was “not emergent in the sense that death would
likely result immediately upon failure to perform
it.”5 The 1920 case, according to the court, “implicitly acknowledges” that a physician may perform an
operation “under emergent circumstances — i.e.,
when death is likely to result immediately upon failure to perform it.”2 In its application of the reasoning of this pre-NICU case to Miller v. HCA, the court
ruled, “We hold that a physician, who is confronted with emergent circumstances and provides lifesustaining treatment to a minor child, is not liable
for first obtaining consent from the parents.”2
This is a reasonable rule when parents are not
available for consultation and consent, but what if
the parents are present and refuse? The court concludes that parental presence (and refusal to give
consent) simply does not matter in extreme cases,
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because the exception that allows treatment in
emergency circumstances is not based on the concept of implied consent. The physician is privileged
by law to treat in emergency circumstances because
he or she is trying to prevent a harm (death) that
outweighs any harm from treatment. Other courts
have ruled that consent is “implied” in emergencies; however, the Texas court correctly saw this
formulation as wrong (no one implies anything simply by having a medical emergency, and if this were
the correct rule, contemporaneous explicit refusal
of treatment by the Millers would have to have been
honored).
The court’s conclusion is another way of saying
that physicians in emergencies are permitted to err
on the side of the preservation of life. But, as this
case illustrates, in situations that involve extremely
premature neonates, the choice is never so clear-cut.
It is not life or death alone, but the chance of survival in a severely disabled condition such as Sidney’s,
that makes these decisions so difficult. Nonetheless, after the determination that treatment was necessary to save the child’s life had been reached, the
only remaining issue for the court was procedural:
Is a physician obligated to seek court approval before he or she proceeds with emergency treatment
when the parents object to it?
The Millers contended that there was plenty of
time to seek a court order because they had objected to treatment 11 hours before the birth and that
physicians should not be permitted to delay a decision in such a case until the situation becomes an
emergency. The court agreed that the “physician
cannot create emergent circumstances from his or
her own delay or inaction and escape liability for
proceeding without consent.”2 Nonetheless, the
court concluded that the circumstances of extreme
prematurity were unique because a decision about
resuscitation could not reasonably be made before
birth. In the court’s words:
The evidence established that Sidney could
only be properly evaluated when she was
born. Any decision the Millers made before
Sidney’s birth concerning her treatment at or
after her birth would necessarily be based on
speculation. [A decision made before the
birth] could not control whether the circumstances facing Dr. Otero were emergent because it would not have been a fully informed
one according to the evidence in this case.2
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The only remaining question was whether Otero
himself was negligent in making the decision to resuscitate Sidney without either parental consent or
a court order. The court decided he was not negligent because of the nature of the decision itself:
“Dr. Otero had to make a split-second decision and
[even though] the Millers were both present in the
delivery room, there was simply no time to obtain
their consent to treatment or to institute legal proceedings . . . without jeopardizing Sidney’s life.”2
Moreover, since the circumstances that required
this “split-second decision” resulted from the inability to evaluate Sidney until she was born, not
from any delay or inaction on the part of the hospital or physicians, neither the hospital nor the physician could be held responsible for the emergency
situation. The court, while stressing that the best
practice is to obtain parental consent before birth
to make an evaluation and render “warranted medical treatment,” concluded, “We decline to impose
liability [for either battery or negligence] on a physician solely for providing life-sustaining treatment
under emergent circumstances to a new-born infant
without that consent.”2

decisions at birth
The conclusion of the court — that an informed decision about resuscitating an extremely premature
infant can be made only by actually examining the
infant at birth — is perfectly reasonable and is in accord with good medical practice. There is no clinical test or objective indicator that can accurately predict outcome (the hospital denied that it had a rule
about the resuscitation of infants who weigh at
least 500 g, and even if it had such an arbitrary rule,
this would have been no substitute for a more comprehensive evaluation of the infant at birth). The
court did not have to say more to decide the case in
front of it, but more can and probably should be
said. Many observers had hoped that this case would
help to clarify the legal rules about decision making
for extremely premature infants and help physicians
and hospitals to develop better procedures for making treatment decisions in this area of great and inherent medical uncertainty.3,6 More specific guidelines were probably too much to hope for, and the
ultimate court decision was a very narrow one. For
example, although the ruling permits a neonatologist to make decisions about resuscitation immediately after birth in the case of extreme prematurity,
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nothing in the decision requires the presence of a
neonatologist at the delivery.
More troubling, the court implies that life is always preferable to death for a newborn and thus
could be interpreted in the future to support the
neonatologist who always resuscitates newborns,
no matter how premature or how unlikely their survival is without severe disabilities. This interpretation, however, seems problematic, because such a
neonatologist is not exercising any medical judgment or making a “split-second” decision. In these
circumstances, the decision to attempt resuscitation
has been made at a time during which the court believes it cannot reasonably be made: before the birth.
All-or-nothing responses, nonetheless, seem to be
common in neonatology. As Cole has observed, “In
the absence of biologically reliable predictors of outcome, decisions on care for extremely premature infants have historically fallen between the inflexible
extremes of mandated nontreatment and mandated
full treatment by relying on individual evaluation by
parents and physicians.”7
Given the inherent uncertainty in outcomes,
trials of therapy that can be ended when reasonable
clinical goals cannot be achieved seem more consistent with legal principles and good medical practice. More data are unlikely to provide a yes-or-no
answer to whether resuscitation should be attempted at birth. In one major prospective study of extremely premature infants, about half of the survivors had substantial disability, with approximately
one quarter having severe disability, and no clear
predictors of outcome were identified.8 The authors
concluded, “The prevention or amelioration of disability in survivors of extreme prematurity remains
one of the most important challenges in medicine.”8
Life is not always preferable to death, as was made
clear by the exceptions to the old Baby Doe regulations (which pertained to refusals of treatment for
disabled, not premature, newborns) and by the entire series of so-called right-to-die cases.9

dec isions in the nic u
The decision to resuscitate Sidney triggered a new
series of decisions about her continued treatment.
Although these decisions were not the subject of
the lawsuit, the Texas Supreme Court has made it
clear that the parents had the legal authority to make
all of these subsequent decisions. If the parents
disagreed with the physicians about, for example,
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whether to continue ventilation, the obligation of
the physicians was either to follow the wishes of the
parents nonetheless or to seek court authorization
to ignore them. It seems unlikely, for instance, that
anyone would have questioned the Millers’ decision
to cease the provision of aggressive care after Sidney had the intracranial bleeding that drastically decreased her chances of living anything but a severely disabled life. Giving parents the right to make
treatment decisions for their extremely premature
newborns in the NICU not only is consistent with
basic legal principles but also accords with good
medical practice.7 Treatment in the high-technology NICU, however, takes on a life of its own, and
although there is no ethical or legal difference between starting and stopping an intervention such
as ventilation, stopping it is much more emotionally and psychologically difficult for both parents and
physicians. This is just one reason why trials of
therapy should be discussed before they are initiated and why such trials should be evaluated at regular intervals to reevaluate the child’s condition to
see if their therapeutic goals remain reasonable or
achievable.
Reasonable people may disagree about what the
therapeutic goals should be. Defining a therapeutic goal depends on a combination of the medical
prognosis, the family’s circumstances, and the quality of life of the child, and no one-size-fits-all legal
or medical rule is possible. Even the standard of the
best interests of the child raises questions. The
phrase “best interests” is often translated into the
unhelpful slogan “better off dead” — that is, the infant should be treated aggressively unless all agree
that he or she would be better off dead. A standard
of benefit or burden would be preferable, but of
course such a standard cannot definitively determine difficult cases. As the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research observed
in 1983:
Permanent handicaps justify a decision not to
provide life-sustaining treatment only when
they are so severe that continued existence
would not be a net benefit to the infant.
Though inevitably somewhat subjective and
imprecise in actual application . . . net
benefit is absent only if the burdens imposed
on the patient by the disability or its treatment
would lead a competent decision maker to
choose to forgo the treatment.10
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The application of a benefit–burden standard would
not have prevented Sidney from being resuscitated in the first place, but it could have led to a more
thoughtful examination of the aggressiveness of
continued treatment after her cranial hemorrhage.
The decision to treat at this point would have remained with the parents.
When I began working in health law and bioethics in 1972, decision making that involved neonates with intracranial bleeding was seen as so difficult, and the outcomes so uncertain, that there
could be no substantive rules, just a procedural one.
That basic procedural rule was that it is acceptable
to withdraw treatment if both the physician and the
parents agree. Implementing this rule led to a backlash, which gave rise to the Baby Doe regulations,
which were drafted in response to a 1981 case in
which parents refused to consent to a surgical repair of a tracheal-esophageal fistula that would have
enabled the child to eat. The baby died during the
court proceedings. The Baby Doe regulations were
based on the assumption (never demonstrated, and
almost certainly wrong) that many physicians were
terminating treatment because of “quality-of-life”
assessments that devalued disability.9,11 The standard of the best interests of the child returned to
prominence, and child neglect became a relevant
factor in treatment decisions for neonates.9,12
When asked about the Miller case, Dr. C. Everett
Koop, the former surgeon general of the United
States and main promoter of the Baby Doe regulations, was quoted as saying, “I don’t think parents
should have the discretion to kill their children. I’m
a great believer in the slippery slope. You get into
the terrible quagmire of having only perfect children, and nobody can guarantee that.”6 Koop is, of
course, correct about guarantees, but it is the very
inability of physicians to predict outcomes that
leads most commentators to insist that parents,
with physicians’ input, be the ones to make the ultimate decisions about treatment for their children,
at least when there exists a range of reasonable medical options, including termination of treatment.1,7
In addition, although the court did not deal with the
issue, many of the interventions in the NICU, including resuscitation, can reasonably be classified
as experimental.13

implica tions of the dec ision
The Texas Supreme Court’s decision limits physicians’ discretion to the moments immediately after
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birth. The court does not require the neonatologist
or obstetrician to treat or resuscitate a newborn,
only to decide whether or not to treat or resuscitate
newborns at birth. The standard to be applied in
making this determination is never well articulated,
since both the best interests of the child and the contention that the treatment is “warranted” are vague
and can often be used to justify a decision either to
treat or not to treat. The Texas Supreme Court has
made clear that after the initial “emergency” assessment, when many more treatment decisions must
be made in the NICU, parental consent is legally required; if such consent is not forthcoming, a court
order must be obtained before treatment proceeds.
More important are the ethical issues that pertain
to decision making in the NICU, and these require,
at the least, clear, regular, and honest discussions
with the parents about the health of and prognosis
for their child, as well as trials of therapy that have
realistic stopping points. Because clear rules seem
to be impossible to formulate in this arena, adherence to reasonable procedures in making treatment decisions may be the best we can do.
The narrow decision of the Texas Supreme Court
was reasonable but nonetheless unfortunate for the
Millers. The result to Sidney was not entirely predictable, but the financial consequences of a lifetime of medical care — the cost will total in the tens
of millions of dollars — were foreseeable. Public
funding of Sidney’s care would certainly help the
Millers, and such funding could have made this

lawsuit unnecessary. To the extent that society insists on treatment, public support may be morally
obligatory, so that, as the President’s Commission
noted more than 20 years ago, “these children,
once rescued [in NICUs], are not then left to drown
in a sea of indifference and unresponsiveness.”10
From the Department of Health Law, Bioethics, and Human
Rights, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston.
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